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Over the last decade there has been a major push
within policy circles to strengthen community
initiatives related to natural resources management.
The success or failure of such projects is an
important issue for decision-makers who are
interested in poverty alleviation. A new SANDEE
study from Sri Lanka looks at the factors that affect
the performance and sustainability of one such
group of projects. It focuses on Community-Based
Aquaculture (CBA) schemes in the interior of the
country. Although these have the potential to be an
important source of protein for poor communities,
many CBA projects in the country are failing.
The study looks in particular at one of the key challenges the
aquaculture projects face – the amount of time and resources that
must be devoted to the organization and planning of collective work.
These factors are valued economically as the “transaction costs”
associated with such community-oriented projects. The study finds
that transaction costs have a substantial negative impact on a
significant number of the CBA schemes. Thus, policy makers must
find a way of reducing the transaction costs if community aquaculture
projects in central Sri Lanka are to be more profitable and sustainable.
AQUACULTURE AT A CROSSROAD
CBA is carried out in many of the traditional irrigation tanks that are a
feature of the interior region of Sri Lanka. However aquaculture is not
a traditional use of these village tanks. Indeed, the village tank
aquaculture programme was only launched in the late 1970s when
government breeding stations provided fish ‘fingerlings’ to kick start
the aquaculture process.  This was an attempt by the government to
provide easy access to protein in the interior areas of Sri Lanka. Despite
early signs of success, the aquaculture programme faced total collapse
in 1990 when the government decided to withdraw support. However,
the programme was resumed again in 1994 as a community-based
venture with the government providing only initial catalytic support.
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The outcome of the programme
since then has been mixed. While
a handful of communities have
succeeded in completing a few
production cycles, the programme
has faced problems in many tanks.
These failures are usually attributed
to practical problems such as lack
of extension staff, scarcity of fish
fingerlings or poor coordination
among relevant stakeholders.
Although these explanations go
some way towards explaining the
slow progress of the state
programmes they do not give the
whole picture. Transaction costs
represent another, more
fundamental, reason for failure. In
this study, transaction costs
constitute the economic, resource
and time investments needed to
organize collective action. They
include work such as gathering
information, undertaking
negotiations, making agreements,
preventing ‘free rider’ activity (e.g.
stopping poachers), ensuring
compliance, organizing harvesting
and monitoring the distribution of
benefits. It is clear that if these
costs are too high, and returns
comparatively low, then people will
be discouraged from taking part in
any CBA scheme.
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THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CBA PROGRAMME
Athula Senaratne and Kalpa Karunanayake of the National Aquaculture
Development Authority of Sri Lanka address two key questions facing
policy makers and community leaders - why collective action is
successful in managing certain common property resources while it fails
in others, and what conditions would ensure successful cooperation
among community groups. This study was conducted between 2003
and 2004 in the Anuradhapura district, which is located in the heart of
the dry zone in Sri Lanka. It is also the district with the highest inland fish
production in the country and is the location of some 2,334 inland water
bodies, covering a total inland water area of 51,500 ha. It ranks first in
the country in terms of production of freshwater fish.
The study is based on primary data collected both at the community and
household level. Information comes from a total of 41 communities
(each community linked to a specific irrigation tank CBA programme).
This represents a total of 340 households and covers a majority of locations
where CBA had been recently carried out. Information about each tank
and the community it supports comes from a number of sources,
including official records, village officers, agriculture and irrigation officers,
members of farmer organizations and village elders.
Transaction costs are assessed by looking at the amount of time that
people spend on ‘transaction’ activities linked to the CBA programme.
The cost of this work is then assessed using local wage rates as a proxy
for the value of people’s time. The calculation of transaction costs for
the monitoring of poachers is done in a slightly different way. This is
because monitoring is usually undertaken during the night and the use
of general wage rates in this case is not appropriate. Hired watchers carry
out monitoring for a number of the tanks. The average wage rate paid to
these watchers is therefore used to estimate this cost in all the other
tanks.
TABLE : TRANSACTIONS IN CBA IN VILLAGE
IRRIGATION TANKS
Type Transactions
Searching and information Accessing scientific methods and species for
culture
Collective decision making Organizing meetings, reaching agreements,
coordinating with authorities
Enforcement and monitoring Organization of tank preparation actions,
compliance stocking, etc.
Prevention of free rider activity Protection from poaching
Distribution of benefits Organizing harvesting




Rural poverty and malnutrition are
common in the inland dry zone of Sri
Lanka. One of the key reasons for this
is that fish (which makes up a large
percentage of most Sri Lankans’ protein
intake) from the sea is limited in
supply. The low availability of animal
proteins in the inland dry zone areas
makes the production of freshwater fish
using the existing village infrastructure
very attractive.
The potential for village tanks to help
the poor is shown by their historical
usage by communities. The tanks are
basically communally-owned rainwater-
harvesting devices for paddy cultivation
and have helped successive generations
achieve food security for over two
millennia. In addition to irrigation,
tanks also provide water for domestic
use: bathing, washing and animal
husbandry. Given such a time-tested
record of collective action, there is
obviously great potential to develop
CBA in these tanks.
CBA in village irrigation tanks has
specific features that appeal strongly
to policy makers. The major policy
advantages are: (a) the involvement
of local resources and the direct
contact with the rural poor; (b) the
obligatory need for community
participation due to common
ownership of tanks; (c) the ability to
cater to the needs of a large section
of the population; (d) the low cost
nature of the technologies involved and
their success in demonstration
projects; and (e) the potential to





The study finds that CBA involves three main types of management:
farmer organizations (FO), a sub-group within a FO called a Fisheries
Sub-Committee (FSC) and out-sourcing to third parties. A FSC is the
most popular CBA management scheme and is found in two-thirds of
the sample. The major advantage of this arrangement is that it limits the
number of people claiming benefits from CBA to a manageable number.
It also allows for management activities to be undertaken by a limited
number of active participants in an independent manner.
All three institutional arrangements involve transaction costs associated
with information provision, collective decision-making, and the protection
of fish harvests from poachers. While the costs of information provision
and collective decision-making are relatively low under all three
institutional arrangements, the cost of fish protection from poachers is
significant in all cases. However, this latter cost is considerably reduced
when an entire FO is involved in tank management. This means that the
lowest average aggregate transaction cost is reported in FO-managed
village tanks, while, the impact of transaction costs is particularly
significant in FSC-managed tanks.
The high cost of protecting fish from poachers is not surprising: of all the
problems facing the people involved in the CBA programmes this is the
most widespread. This problem is reported in two-thirds of the tanks in
the sample. In a few tanks it is at a crisis level and the authorities have
been called in to deal with the problem. Hence, the so-called ‘free-rider’
problem has the potential to cause a significant impact on the
sustainability of the CBA
programme, making it difficult to
rally the necessary cooperation
among community members.
ARE THE BENEFITS OF
CBA ENOUGH?
On the whole, CBA helps FOs to
generate much needed cash
revenue in a majority of tanks. It
also moderately increases the
supply of animal proteins to the
rural poor. However, while
community-based fisheries
contribute cash to farmer
organizations and bolster village
food security, the benefits to
individual farmers are low.  This
means that farmers have little
incentive to participate in collective
action. Moreover, once the
transaction costs are taken into
consideration, particularly the cost
incurred by monitoring activities,
CBA becomes even less
economically attractive. In fact,
only 35% of the 41 tanks indicate
a positive net benefit from
aquaculture once all transaction
costs are taken into account.
Notably, of the three institutional
arrangements, the FSC is the most
successful in terms of generating
benefits to individual members.
However, once transaction costs are
accounted for, a smaller
percentage of FSC run tanks (33%)
show a positive net benefit from
aquaculture relative Farmer
Organization (50%) run tanks.
Thus, including transaction costs
changes our understanding of
which institutional regime is likely
to be more successful.
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In terms of people’s attitudes towards CBA, it seems that households
with variable, seasonal sources of income are more attracted towards it
than households that have a more regular source of income. This is
quite understandable given the fact that the opportunity costs involved
are usually higher for regular income earners than for those with seasonal
employment.
Another key factor that affects the benefits provided by CBA are the
tanks themselves. It is clear that different tanks have significantly different
productivity levels. Hence, selecting tanks with adequate productivity
levels is vital to future success.
HOW TO MAKE CBAS MORE PRODUCTIVE AND
SUSTAINABLE
Overall, Senaratne and Karunanayake’s extended cost analyses show
that transaction costs have a substantial economic impact on a
significant number of tanks. They find that the impact of these costs is
particularly significant in FSC-managed tanks, which are in fact the most
widespread and productive of the CBA schemes.
FO schemes have the largest number of beneficiaries and the lowest
transaction costs.  But they have a lower return per beneficiary.  This
poses a dilemma.  If the transaction costs are to be decreased, one
would choose an FO scheme but perhaps because of coordination
problems, these tanks also generate less revenue.
This study suggests that the sustainability of tank-aquaculture will depend
on both reducing transaction costs and enlarging the share of benefits
that go to those people who bear these costs. Senaratne and
Karunanayake conclude that further experiments with institutional
arrangements are required to make this happen.
